Prosecutorial Misconduct

The below-cited case unconstitutionally held that prosecutors may violate the constitutional rights of a defendant in prosecuting a case and the prosecutor may knowingly use false testimony and suppress evidence.

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)

Imbler v. Pachtman No. 74-5435

Argued November 3, 1975

Decided March, 1976 424 U.S. 409

Syllabus

            Petitioner, convicted of murder, unsuccessfully petitioned for state habeas corpus on the basis of respondent prosecuting attorney's revelation of newly discovered evidence, and charged that respondent had knowingly used false testimony and suppressed material evidence at petitioner's trial. Petitioner thereafter filed a federal habeas corpus petition based on the same allegations, and ultimately obtained his release. He then brought an action against respondent and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for loss of liberty allegedly caused by unlawful prosecution, but the District Court held that respondent was immune from liability under § 1983, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 

Held:  A state prosecuting attorney who, as here, acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the State's case, is absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983 for alleged deprivations of the accused's constitutional rights.  Pp. 424 U. S. 417-431. 

Section 1983 is to be read in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses, rather than in derogation of them.  Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367. Pp. 424 U. S. 417.  

(b) The same considerations of public policy that underlie the common law rule of absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a suit for malicious prosecution likewise dictate absolute immunity under § 1983. Although such immunity leaves the genuinely wronged criminal defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty, the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would disserve the broader public interest in that it would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system and would often prejudice criminal defendants by skewing post-conviction judicial decisions that should be made with the sole purpose of insuring justice.  Pp. 424 U. S. 420-428. 

500 F.2d 1301, affirmed.

Page 424 U. S. 410

POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER., C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 424 U. S. 432. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F. 2d 617:

This court held that it is okay for the prosecutor to violate the constitutional rights of the defendant and is immune from prosecution for so doing.

Myers v. Morris, 810 Fed 2d:

Prosecutor may file false charges without doing any investigation.

Jones v. Shankland, 9th Circuit Federal Court of Appeals, 800 F. 2d, F. 2b 1310, 1987:

Prosecutor may file charges outside of his jurisdiction. Prosecutor may KNOWINGLY offer perjured testimony and may suppress evidence, yet is immune for doing all of this.

Henzel v. Grettstein, 5th Circuit, Federal Court of Appeals, 608 F. 2d 654, 1979:

Prosecutor can suppress exculpatory evidence and be held immune for so doing.

Ashelman v. Pope, 9th Circuit Federal Court of Appeals, 793 E. 2d at 1072, 1986:

The prosecutor is immune from lawsuits for conspiring with the judge to determine the outcome of the proceedings, in other words, to predetermine the outcome.

Norton v. Liddell, 10th Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, 620 F. 2d, p. 1375, 1980:

The prosecutor may KNOWINGLY file charges against an innocent person for crimes that never occurred.

Pinder v. Johnson, 4th Circuit Court, 33 F. 3rd, p. 368-372, 1994:

The court held that, in general, the public has no constitutional right to be protected from harm inflicted by third parties. This means that the police, who are paid by the public, have no duty to protect the public.

Ketchum v. Alameida County, 811 F. 2d, 1243, 1989 & Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F. 2d, 616, [The district court, 486 F.Supp. 742 granted summary judgment for all defendants and ordered the complaint dismissed. With regard to the private defendants, the basis for the court's action was an affidavit of a qualified expert which states that they used all due professional care in their treatment of Vanda. The plaintiff's failure to offer any counter affidavit shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding these defendants' due care.]

The ruling in Bowers upheld Ketchum, namely the Constitution is a charter of negative liberties and does not require the state to provide services to the people.

”There is a constitutional right not to be murdered by a state officer, for the state violates the Fourteenth Amendment when its officer, acting under color of state law, deprives a person of life without due process of law.

Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 404-05 (5th Cir. 1961).

But there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution. The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order.”